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YOU'VE COME A LONG WAY, BABY:
THE BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME REVISITED
Gladys, an impoverished black woman, had been battered by
her husband throughout their marriage.1 The abuse began the day
after they were married, and continued intermittently for the next
seven years.2 Her husband Ernest's excessive drinking usually
accompanied the violence, and the abuse occasionally occurred in
public.3 One day, after a series of arguments during which an
inebriated Ernest refused to give her money to shop for food for the
family, he started to club and bite her while they were walking down
the street.4 During the ensuing struggle, Gladys pulled a pair of
scissors from her purse and stabbed her husband, killing him.'
During a five year marriage Sherry was frequently pistol
whipped, threatened with knives, and once beaten so badly with a
tire iron that she was hospitalized.6 Sherry filed for divorce and
obtained restraining orders against her husband.7 Disregarding the
restraining orders, he persistently stalked and harassed her, lurking
in doorways and leaping out to assault her.' She returned home one
evening only to find him hiding in her darkened apartment.9 When
he told her he was going to kill her and seemed to be groping in a
1 State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 369 (N.J. 1984). See also LENORE E. WALKER,
TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SocIETY RESPONDs 208-09
(1989); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing Women's Self-Defense Work
and the Problems of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 195 (1986)
[hereinafter Schneider, Describing].




6 State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 313-14 (Wash. 1984); see also David B. Kuhns,
Note, State v. Allery: Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome is Admissible,
21 WILLIAMETrE L. REv. 410 (1985).
7 Allery, 682 P.2d at 313; Kuhns, Note, supra note 6, at 410.
a Allery, 682 P.2d at 313; Kuhns, Note, supra note 6, at 410.
9 Allery, 682 P.2d at 313; Kuhns, Note, supra note 6, at 410.
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kitchen drawer for a knife, she shot and killed him."
Brenda testified that her husband had twice tried to kill her,
once by smothering her with a pillow, and then by placing a radio
in the bathtub while she was bathing." He had also threatened to
kill her children if she pursued a domestic violence charge she had
brought against him.'2  In between these outbursts of acute
violence, some of which had been witnessed by others, their
marriage was superficially calm. 3 One night, Brenda noticed a gun
she had never seen before on a table by her husband's bedside. 4
Convinced the gun signaled an escalation in his intentions and that
he would kill her with it, she picked up the gun and shot him after
he had hit her."s
Gladys, 6 Sherry, 7 and Brenda" are representative of
battered women who have asserted a defense of justifiable
homicide. 9 Usually, the woman has survived years of beatings,
alternating with periods of relative domestic tranquility.20 Women
who have raised evidence of Battered Woman's Syndrome in support
of justifiable homicide have generally been the victims of at least two
acute battering incidents.' The cases tend to follow one of two
scenarios: (1) at some point in the latest incident, the woman
perceives a shift in her attacker, indicative of increased danger.'
1 Allery, 682 P.2d at 313-14; Kuhns, Note, supra note 6, at 410. Originally,
Sherry Allery had been convicted of second degree murder. Her conviction was
overturned on appeal. Allery, 682 P.2d at 313.





16 State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
1' State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984).
18 State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990).
19 WALKER, supra note 1. See also CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE
(1989); MILDRED DALEY PAGELOW, WOMEN-BATTERING (1981).
2 Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369 (N.J. 1984); Koss, 682 P.2d at 315 (Wash. 1984); Kelly,
551 N.E.2d at 971 (Ohio 1990). See WALKER, supra note 1, at 6; PAGELOW, supra note
19, at 21.
21 WALKER, supra note 1, at 102. Cases which exemplify this include: Kelly, 478
A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984); People v. Torrez, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); State
v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989); State v. Leidholn, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D.
1983); Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990).
' State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 313 (Wash. 1984).
[Vol. IX
NOTES
As he is about to strike her, she repels the attack with deadly
force,' (2) or, as in the case of Brenda above, after years of savage
brutalization, the woman takes advantage of an opportunity to catch
her abuser off-guard and kills him to defend herself from the
brutality she knows will inevitably come when he awakens.24
This Note will examine the legal issues surrounding the use
of Battered Woman's Syndrome by defendants claiming justifiable
homicide. It will review the current experts' theories concerning
battered women and survey the court cases decided in the last
decade to assess the trends in the acceptance of these theories.
Although there have been many instances in which Battered
Woman's Syndrome has been asserted by a defendant,25 this Note
will be confined to an examination of those cases in which a woman
who killed her spouse/boyfriend was charged with homicide, and
asserted a complete defense to the homicide charge.26
The analysis will focus on the two controversial issues
common to all Battered Woman's Syndrome cases: whether expert
testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome will be admissible, and
if so, to what degree, and which standard of reasonableness should
be applied to the perceived danger. Finally, this Note will offer
some reflections from the feminist literature on the use of Battered
Woman's Syndrome, along with recommendations for changes in the
law of justifiable homicide as it pertains to battered women.
2 Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369 (N.J. 1984).
24 WALKER, supra note 1. See also GILLESPIE, supra note 19.
' For example, in a highly publicized case in New York City, Hedda
Nussbaum asserted Battered Woman's Syndrome to justify her inability to prevent
her common-law husband from beating and eventually killing their adopted
daughter. Nussbaum exchanged her testimony against her husband, Joel Steinberg,
for immunity from prosecution in the child's death. WALKER, supra note 1, at 147-
51. Another notorious case, made into a television movie, dealt with a woman
(Francine Hughes) who used Battered Woman's Syndrome to buttress her plea of
temporary insanity when she was tried for setting her abusive husband on fire. Id.
at 25.
' Of necessity, this analysis will focus on cases reported on the appellate level.
However, there is agreement among experts that many of the cases of battered
woman killing their attackers are not in print because the women have not
appealed their convictions. See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 19; WALKER, supra
note 1.
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I. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS
A. Definitions
Who are these battered women? Experts in the field agree
that they can be "everywoman"- they come from every nation,
socioeconomic background and level of education; they are mothers
and homemakers, and many are successful professionals.27 Lenore
Walker,' the preeminent expert on Battered Woman's Syndrome in
the United States, defines the typical battered woman as one who is
"subjected repeatedly to coercive behavior (physical, sexual, and/or
psychological) by a man attempting to force her to do what he wants
... and who, as a member of a couple, has experienced at least two
acute battering incidents."'29
According to Walker, the dynamics of the abusive
relationship occur in a cycle composed of three phases: tension-
building, the acute battering incident, and the tranquil, loving or
nonviolent phase.' The first phase is characterized by minor
battering incidents, such as slaps, controlled verbal abuse and
psychological warfare.31 The woman allows the behavior to continue
because the incidents seem comparatively minor, and because she
desperately wants to prevent the violence from growing worse;3 2
' See PAGELOW, supra note 19, at 21; WALKER, supra note 1, at 101. See generally
GILLESPIE, supra note 19. Walker's text contains case studies of battered women who
were, variously, a Baltimore socialite married to surgeon, a member of the
Hawaiian royal family, a psychologist, a lawyer, a waitress, a middle class Jewish
editor (Hedda Nussbaum), and an elementary school teacher. Additionally, one
judge noted "researchers have shown that many battered women are highly
competent... career women, who include among their ranks doctors, lawyers,
nurses, homemakers, politicians and psychologists." Commonwealth v. Stonehouse,
555 A.2d 772, 807 (Pa. 1989).
I Dr. Lenore Walker has provided expert testimony on Battered Woman's
Syndrome in over 150 homicide trials throughout the United States. She is the
Executive Director of the Domestic Violence Institute in Denver Colo., a Professor
of Psychology at the University of Denver, and serves as President of the
Psychology of Women Division of the American Psychological Association.
" WALKER, supra note 1, at 102. Dr. Walker was the first psychologist to study
thoroughly the psychological profile of battered women. Her extensive research
led her to develop the concept of Battered Woman's Syndrome and subsequently
coin the term.
30 Id. at 42-44.
" Id. at 42.
32 Id. at 43.
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she is also committed to preserving the relationship, and willing to
make what seem like minor sacrifices to do so.' This desire proves
to be a double-edged sword, for her docile behavior legitimizes her
partner's belief that he had a right to abuse her in the first place.'
During this phase the woman commonly goes to excessive lengths to
rationalize her mate's behavior and conceal the abuse from others,
isolating herself from potential sources of assistance.' As the cycle
progresses, "her [placatory] techniques become less effective, and
violence and verbal abuse worsen."' The spiralling effect of the loss
of control adds exponentially to the pressure.37 At some point, the
tension becomes so unbearable that the woman withdraws
emotionally, triggering the next phase.'
The acute phase is remarkable for its savagery and
uncontrolled nature; 9 the violence escalates to a point of a rampage,
resulting in serious injury and sometimes death.' At this point, the
woman feels psychologically trapped.4' Her outwardly submissive
demeanor functions as a defense mechanism, cloaking a sense of
distance from the attacks and from their terrible pain.' The
knowledge that her attacker is so much physically stronger than she
reinforces her need to maintain the appearance of calm. 3
The third phase is distinguished by forgiveness, relative
tranquility and an illusory sense of resolution.' The couple
experiences profound relief that the violence has abated, and the
batterer often exhibits warm, loving behavior towards his mate.45
Id.
34 WALKER, supra note 1, at 43.
1 Id. In fact, even if she manages to call the authorities, police departments
across the country attest to the difficulty in breaking up an acute battering incident
because of its savage intensity. Id. at 44.
36 Id. at 43.
37 Id.
' Id. The psychological anguish the woman feels causes her to distance herself
emotionally from her mate. Id.
3 WALKER, supra note 1, at 43.
' Id. Some women will even provoke an acute incident, just to "get it over
with," thus ending the tension associated with waiting for the explosion. Id.
41 Id. at 44.
4 Id.
43 Id.
" WALKER, supra note 1, at 44-45.
45 Id.
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He begs her forgiveness, and promises there will be no
recurrences.' This final phase is the one in which the woman
sustains the greatest psychological harm.' The two parties exhibit
their mutual emotional dependence - her for his caring behavior, he
for forgiveness. "Underneath the grim cycle of tension, violence, and
forgiveness that make their love truly terrifying, each partner may
believe that death is preferable to separation. . . . In fact, many
battered women who kill their abusers start out intending to commit
suicide themselves. "48
It would be difficult to comprehend the plight of a battered
woman without first examining the profile of a typical batterer. The
following description was developed by Dr. Walker after extensive
research and treatment of couples and individuals in battering
relationships. Most batterers begin their relationships with
seemingly normal behaviors; the violence is rarely apparent at the
outset.-° The batterer tends to believe in the supremacy of the male
and adheres to stereotypical sex roles within the family."1 He
commonly believes others are responsible for causing his (re)actions,
and experiences chronic, pathological jealousy.52 Typically, he also
experiences abnormal reactions to stress, and compulsively consumes
alcohol in attempts to relieve that stress." Most batterers view sex
as an act of power or violence;' frequently, batterers engage in and
seem to require increasingly aberrant sexual behavior in order to
become aroused.' The man believes his acts of violence are
justifiable and that the woman "caused" them;' he is also convinced
Id. at 45.
I d. During this phase, the woman convinces herself that it will never happen
again. She tells herself that this loving man is the one she fell in love with, and,
sensing his despair at the chance of losing her, she seeks to reassure him and
preserve his fragile emotional stability. This illusory rapprochement is a trap. Id.
' Id. The battered woman who kills herself sees suicide as the only way to
break the batterer's control over her and escape further torture. Id.
49 WALKER, supra note 1, at 6-7.









that his violent behavior is beyond his conscious control.57 Further,
his battering follows a pattern and he is likely to have battered more
than one woman, often in similar scenarios.58
B. Psychological Factors
A facility with Battered Woman's Syndrome requires an
exploration of the psychological forces that shape the battered
woman's behavior and the treatment she receives in our judicial
system. According to Walker, Battered Woman's Syndrome is best
understood as a subgroup of what the American Psychological
Association defines as Post Traumatic Stress Disorders, rather than
some form of mental illness. 9  Persons suffering from Post
17 Id.
' Id. at 71-72. Walker's findings comport with those of other researchers as
well. See id. at 72.
9 WALKER, supra note 1, at 48 (referring. to the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCATION, DIAGNoSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, 236 (3d ed. 1980)). Like Rape
Trauma Syndrome and Battered Child Syndrome, this symptomology, also
experienced by Vietnam War Veterans, includes reexperiencing of past traumatic
events, numbing of emotions, avoidance of reminders of the abuse or trauma, and
a hypervigilance to cues of further violence. Id. at 48, 179-80. It is important to
underscore the point that women suffering from Battered Women Syndrome are
not considered mentally ill, or psychotic; in fact, evidence indicates that once a
battered woman is free of her tormentor, she is most likely to become symptom
free. Id. at 181. Many cases describe this symptomology; see, e.g., People v. Aris,
264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 178 (1989). There is an additional theoretical construct, that of
intermittent reinforcement, which operates to keep the woman in the relationship.
As Walker describes it,
The battered woman may not know, from one minute to the
next, whether she'll be faced with her "good" husband or her
"bad" husband. Sometimes he indulges her ... [with] loving
behavior. At other times he displays physical and psychological
cruelty. Likewise, she may not know if sex will be pleasurable
and loving, or if it will take the form of violent rape. In
situations where the nature of the couple's sexual experience
differs according to the whims and personality changes of the
batterer, loving sex often has the effect of a positive
reinforcement for the battered woman. Because it is sometimes
pleasurable, at the times when it is abusive she may still hope
that "the next time will be better."
WALKER, supra note 1, at 47 (applying the behavioral psychology theory to explain
one of the factors which tend to keep the woman with her abuser). See also supra
note 47 and accompanying text.
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Traumatic Stress Disorder are defined as those having been
repeatedly and unpredictably exposed to a stressor and who develop
certain psychological symptoms, such as heightened vigilance and
flashbacks, that affect their ability to function long after the original
trauma has occurred.' As such, these women are "emotionally
devastated by unalleviated stress, entrapment, and terrible
isolation."' The continuing abuse stimulates the development of
coping responses that severely circumscribe the woman's ability to
see alternatives to her traumatic situation.62 "[Wjhether it is true or
not, [she] ceases to believe anything she can do will have a
predictable, positive effect."'
The dynamic of fear is the dominant psychological
component underlying the battered woman's behavior;(, it
permeates her entire existence.' As Walker notes:
Terror of her abuser is a seed . . . planted in the psyche of
the battered woman by repeated subjection to psychologically
sadistic manipulation and physical bullying; it grows and,
0 Id. at 48, 179-80.
61 Id. at 46-47. Or, as a Kansas court described it, "[tihe abuse is so severe, for
so long a time, and the threat of great bodily harm so constant... [they become]
terror-stricken people whose mental state... bears a marked resemblance to that
of a hostage or a prisoner of war." Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772,
801-02 n.6 (Kan. 1989) (quoting State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985)).
62 WALKER, supra note 1, at 48, 50.
Id. at 48. Walker's theory relies in part on the concept of learned helplessness
(developed in part by other psychologists, as well as through her own extensive
research over the past 10 years). This theory posits that the intermittent
reinforcement characteristic of the third phase of the battering cycle makes it more
likely that the woman will remain with her abuser because she comes to believe
that the only way she can control the situation is by ensuring its predictability. She
avoids the unknown (even escape) at all costs, convinced that the demons she
knows are preferable to those she does not know at all. This intermittent
reinforcement renders the battered woman so unable to predict her own safety that
she is convinced nothing she or anyone else can do will alter her horrible
circumstances. Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 64.
Id. Other experts, and courts, have concurred with Walker's assertion that
fear is the controlling factor in the battered woman's behavior. See, e.g., Tourlakis
v. Morris, 738 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (S.D. Ohio 1990); see also Phyllis L. Crocker, The
Meaning of Equality For Battered Women Who Kill Men In Self-Defense, 8 HARV.
WOMEN's L.J. 121 (1985); Roberta K. Thyfault, Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome
On Trial, 20 CAL. W. L. REv. 485, 489 (1984).
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grows until she is incapable of believing in the effectiveness
of taking positive action on her own behalf . . It is
common for a severely battered woman to believe that the
batterer is omnipotent, capable of coming after her no matter
where she is, even capable of transcending death itself to
inflict pain and terror on her again. This supposedly
irrational fear finds its logical basis within the context of the
battering situation, for it is the situation itself that invokes
it.66
C. Sociological Factors
The dynamic of fear described above serves only as a partial
answer to the question most commonly asked of battered women:
why do they remain in relationships with the men who abuse them
so severely?67  Experts explain that this pattern of fear, in
combination with certain societal factors, gives rise to the seemingly
illogical phenomenon of passivity.6
These societal forces can be broken down into several
categories. It is of primary importance to recognize that the fear
battered women experience is entirely well-founded and rationally
based.' Research conducted by domestic violence experts indicates
that it is statistically more likely that battered women will be killed by their
abusive partners during separation, divorce and custody proceedings - i.e,
when the woman has left or has tried to end the relationship - than at any
other time in the relationship.7" Those who leave and survive have
6 WALKER, supra note 1, at 64.
' Id. at 70. The issue of why the battered woman remains with her abuser has
been commented upon by a number of other experts who lend support to Walker's
theory that fear is the controlling factor in these women's lives. See, e.g., People v.
Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Equal Rights To Trial For Women: Sex Bias In The Law Of Self-Defense, 15 HAR.C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 623, 626-27 (1980) [hereinafter Schneider, Equal Rights]; Thyfault, supra
note 65, at 488-89.
68 WALKER, supra note 1, at 70.
' Id. at 65.
o Id. (emphasis added). Walker's assertion is based on her own research
conducted in Denver, Colorado, as well as on homicide statistics compiled by the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, and in Virginia and New
York. The CDC statistics, analyzed by a team of sociologists, indicate that most of
the women had been killed after they separated from or divorced their partners. Id.
See also State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984); Thyfault, supra note 65, at 494.
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usually been met with coercive and sadistic responses by their
batterers.' Often, the man terrorizes the woman by holding
children or pets hostage, or by publicly humiliating her in such a
way that she is socially ostracized and alienated from those who
might otherwise offer her assistance. 2 Walker's research indicates
that battered women who eventually kill their abusers have usually
been through one or more such attempts at escape from their
torture 3 The lesson they invariably learn is that it is too dangerous to
leave.74 Walker explains that these findings reflect the batterer's
extreme fear of abandonment, which leads him to kill rather than
separate from the battered woman.7' As a result, the woman
correctly concludes that her abuser will do anything to keep her from
leaving him, including killing her, her children or other family
members.7 6
Walker further theorizes that a number of psycho-social
concepts taught to females in our sdciety conditions them to accept
the battering relationship.' She posits that women are taught to
accept the temper outbursts of men without allowing such outbursts
As one of Thyfault's sources so movingly notes,
Patricia Gross's husband tracked her from Michigan to
Mississippi and threatened to kill her relatives there to force her
to return to him. Judy Austin's live-in boyfriend chased her
from California to Arizona to Wyoming .... Mary McGuire's
husband, teaching submission, made her watch him dig a grave,
kill the family cat, and decapitate a pet horse. When she fled he
brought her back with a gun held to her child's head .... Agnes
Scott's husband found her and cut her up seven years after she
left him. There are cases on record of men still harassing and
beating their wives twenty-five years after the wives left them
and tried to go into hiding. If researchers were not quite so
intent upon assigning the pathological behavior to the women,
they might see that the more telling question is not "Why do the
women stay?" but "Why don't the men let them go?"
Thyfault, supra note 65, at 494 n.86 (quoting ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL, 298-99
(1980)).
' WALKER, supra note 1, at 76.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 102.
74 See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 19; WALKER, supra note 1.
75 See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 19; WALKER, supra note 1.
76 WALKER, supra note 1, at 65-66.
77 Id. at 70; see also GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 107-15.
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to diminish the love they feel for their mates.' Additionally, she
argues that, in our culture, women are trained to believe they must
put up with flaws in the men they love in order to get any love in
return.' Such conditioning is reinforced by societal beliefs that
women are somehow responsible for the behavior of their
husbands," and by the training they receive in being the
peacemaker in their relationships.' Cementing these concepts is the
fact that, like most of us, they too have often been told "it takes two
to make a fight;"'82 this inclines women to believe they are partially
responsible for their abuse.' As evidence of the commonality of
this psycho-social training, most battered women's internal dialogue
is: "if I were only a better wife, I could make him stop beating
me."
84
Other societal factors present often insurmountable barriers
to battered women leaving the abusive situation." Many are
women of limited financial means, mothers with children to support,
and with no resources to assist them in making a successful
transition.' Repeated injuries and psychological torture have often
resulted in the woman quitting her job87 (thus limiting her financial
78 WALKER, supra note 1, at 70.
7 Id.
8 Id.
81 People v. Aris, 214 Cal. Rptr. 167, 178 (1989).
82 WALKER, supra note 1, at 72.
' Id. at 70.
Id. This adage does not hold true in battering relationships, where the man
frequently picks fights without provocation, often waking his mate in her sleep to
initiate an acute battering incident. Walker asserts that the batterer's behavior is
essentially unmotivated by any action the woman takes or doesn't take, and that
men who batter in one relationship tend to batter in all their intimate relationships.
Additionally, research indicates that the batterer's need to control by creating
behavioral standards is common to all spousal battering relationships. Id. at 70-71.
85 Crocker, supra note 65, at 133; Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 67, at 626-
27. See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 19; WALKER, supra note 1.
8 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 80.
1 Crocker, supra note 65, at 133; Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 67, at 626-
27. See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 19; WALKER;'supra note 1. Additionally, the
man's jealousy is so intense that he will not tolerate the woman having any type
of relationship, either work or friendship, outside the home. Her earning power is
also seen as a threat to his masculinity, and most batterers use coercion to keep
their women at home. GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 128; WALKER, supra note 1, at
103, 105, 179; Thyfault, supra note 65, at 486-88.
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resources further) and in her severe isolation, so that she has no
neighbors or friends she can call upon for help.' Alternatively, if
the woman is employed in a professional capacity, she may be
reluctant to sever the relationship with her abuser because she knows
that one of the costs she will bear is the loss of her job and
income."
This is not the end of the story. Even if the woman leaves
the relationship and seeks assistance in a victim's shelter, she will
often need to turn to traditional governmental agencies for help.'
Many women in shelters are forced by necessity to obtain emergency
welfare payments, and to rely on the police for assistance in
obtaining belongings from their home.91 Further complicating the
situation, she and her children often require medical attention and
must depend on public assistance to meet their needs. 2 It is no
wonder that the prospect of such a scenario proves daunting to most
women, especially when their lives have been an unending cycle of
terror and physical abuse.'
Many experts believe that the violence inherent in our society
plays a part in the increasing violence towards women." The
magnitude of this problem is evidenced by statistics which indicate
that at least two million women are severely beaten by their
husbands every year in this country.95 Experts estimate that the
actual number is far greater.96  These experts proffer a social
learning theory as a partial explanation of this domestic violence
8 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 80.
9 PAGELOW, supra note 19, at 121. Pagelow concludes from her research that
leaving the abusing relationship most often requires the woman to relocate; this is
due to the extremely high probability that her former abuser will not let her alone.
Even those women who seek assistance in victims' shelters have said that they quit
their jobs for fear their spouses will commit further violence. This fear was well
grounded, as there are many reported incidents of such men stalking their former
mates at their places of work, or following them when they left work to harass or
commit further violent acts. Id.
90 Crocker, supra note 65, at 132-34; see generally WALKER, supra note 1.
9 PAGELOW, supra note 19, at 153.
See generally WALKER, supra note 1.
9 Id. at 64.
", PAGELOW, supra note 19, at 19-27 (summarizing research studies conducted
on an international scale).
' See authorities cited in GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 202.
96 Id. at 12-13.
NOTES
epidemic.' This theory suggests that when a man first acts
violently against a woman, and that act provides satisfactory
solutions (to him), and leads to no unpleasant consequences (for
him), those acts are likely to be repeated." This social learning
theory also encompasses the notion that our society is one in which
men are trained for "competition, aggressiveness,... physical force,
*.. and a need to dominate and control women" within the family
structure." Other authorities contend that on some levels our
society condones or excuses men who beat women, thus creating
significant indifference to the problems of such violence." As
Gillespie states, "[w]e, as a nation, suffer from a painful ambivalence
about violence against women. We simultaneously deplore it and
excuse it . . . instead of blaming the perpetrator, we go to great
lengths to... blame the victim.'
10 1
Some of these theorists contend that domestic violence is a
natural outgrowth of the sexual stereotyping inherent in our social
system, which also contributes significantly to the limited response
our judicial system has offered victims of domestic violence. 2
Gillespie theorizes that, because we do not encourage women to
defend themselves, a woman who wields a deadly weapon, even in
self-defense, presents a deeply disturbing image that strikes at the
core of our society's cultural stereotypes."3 These cultural
stereotypes follow the battered woman who acts in self-defense
throughout our justice system, diminishing the opportunity she has
for fair treatment."°  Gillespie persuasively argues that these
stereotypes are an underlying cause of the difficulty battered women
experience in obtaining police protection from their abusive
97 PAGELOW, supra note 19, at 29.
" Id. at 31.
9 Id.
100 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 11.
I' d. Prosecutors have argued that defendants provoked their attacker by
dating other men. Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 811 (Pa. 1989).
They have also argued that the women had been the willing partner in the abuse,
or had incurred their injuries as part of a "love game." Crocker, supra note 65, at
133 n.61.
'02 WALKER, supra note 1, at 70; GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 11.
113 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 12. See also State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash.
1977); Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 67, at 627-28.
104 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 12.
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mates." s Frequently, the police are either reluctant to intervene in
the domestic situation, or refuse to arrest the batterer.'" Further,
if a woman actually kills her abuser, the investigating police often
characterize the events as the result of the parties quarreling or
engaging in a domestic altercation."° This characterization along
sex-stereotyped lines makes it far more likely that the woman's
behavior will be interpreted as motivated by anger rather than by
"fear and self-preservation."'" The investigation then tends to
become focused on standard motives for murder, such as revenge
and jealousy.' 9
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
There are two major hurdles facing a battered woman
asserting self-defense in a homicide case. °10  First, she must
convince the court to admit expert testimony on Battered Woman's
Syndrome."' Second, she must convince the court that the
syndrome explains sufficiently why she experienced such an
immediate fear of death that it justified her killing in self-defense."'
While significant progress has been made in overcoming the first
Id. at 12-15.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 15.
10 Id.
109 Id. at 16.
110 A complete defense to homicide is defined as total exculpation of the crime.
As the court in People v. Axis, 264 Cal Rptr. 167 (1989) explains, the California
Penal Code (§§ 197, 198) defines a homicide committed in self-defense as a
"justifiable homicide," as distinguished from an "excusable homicide." The
distinction is that justifiable homicide finds the accused's behavior not criminal,
while excusable homicide may find the defendant guilty of a lesser charge. Id. at
178 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 195, 197 (West 1988)). This court and others have
also used the term "imperfect self-defense," classifying a crime as voluntary
manslaughter when the "person has killed another in honest but unreasonable
belief in the need to kill, or when she uses more force than is reasonably necessary
.... SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES, 849 (5th ed. 1989).
" See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 19; WALKER, supra note 1.
112 This Note does not address the use of the Battered Woman's Syndrome to
buttress a claim of diminished capacity or temporary insanity. Further, this author
concurs with experts in the field that the temporary insanity defense raises a
number of issues detrimental to the woman's cause. See infra notes 276-80 and
accompanying text.
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obstacle, the second remains a serious problem in some jurisdictions.
Each of these issues will be discussed in turn.
A. Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Within the past decade, expert testimony on the Battered
Woman's Syndrome has gained increasing acceptance in most
jurisdictions in the United States."' Until recently, many courts
found such testimony inadmissible on -the grounds that there was
insufficient scientific research to warrant its admission.14
For example, in 1983 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in Ibn-Tamas v. United States"' held that it was not
reversible error to exclude expert testimony on the Battered Woman's
Syndrome, and sustained Ibn-Tamas' conviction for murder."6
Beverly Ibn-Tamas killed her husband in the midst of an acute
" Even on the appellate court level, the case law in this area is voluminous.
Hence, a selective number of cases will be examined which exemplify significant
trends in the field. States that have accepted such testimony include: Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and Washington. While there are no states which
exclude expert testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome categorically, courts in
at least two states (California, Minnesota) have disputed its relevance and
applicability within the last few years. See, e.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167
(Cal. App. 4th 1989) and State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989). Note also
that of the few cases involving battered women that have reached the federal courts
the constitutional challenges raised by appellants have never been sustained. See,
e.g., Thomas v. Am, 728 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1984), affd 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Tourlakis
v. Morris, 738 F.Supp. 1128 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F. Supp. 451
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
"4 See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455.A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983).
" Id. Beverly Ibn-Tamas was originally convicted of second degree murder
and appealed on grounds that expert testimony should have been admitted to
support her claim of justifiable homicide. The Court of Appeals, 407 A.2d 626
(D.C. 1979), remanded for consideration of the expert's (Dr. Walker) qualifications,
and for determination of whether her methods had attained general acceptance
among the scientific community. Id. at 640. This was one of the first courts to
consider testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome in a positive light. On
remand, however, the trial court concluded that the expert testimony should be
excluded due to the novelty of the scientific theory. This decision was upheld on
appeal. Ibn-Tamas, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983). See also Mira Mihajlovich, Comment,
Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law
of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253 (1986).
116 Ibn-Tamas, 455 A.2d 893. 4
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battering incident.117 She testified that there had been recurring
episodes of violence during their marriage, and that her husband had
knocked her to the ground, pressed his knee to her neck until she
lost consciousness, threatened her with a loaded pistol, threw her out
of a moving car to end an argument with her, threatened to kill her
if she ever called the police, and threatened to fracture her skull if
she ever tried to leave him."8 Dr. Ibn-Tamas kept a number of
loaded guns in the house." 9 On the day she killed him, he beat
her with his fists and, despite her pregnancy, kicked her in the
abdomen and picked up a loaded .38 caliber revolver, threw a
suitcase at her and told her to pack up and leave. 20 Continuing
his threats to kill her, he started down the stairs and, as she
attempted to take her daughter with her out the door, he jumped out
at them from the stair landing where she shot him.
121
The court, applying the test developed in Frye v. United
States, 22 found that "the defendant failed to establish a general
acceptance by the expert's colleagues of the methodology used in the
expert's study of 'battered women.""'' The difficulty Beverly Ibn-
Tamas faced at trial was that the study of battered women was in its
infancy.2 In the final analysis, Dr. Walker's proffered testimony
was judged inadmissible because Battered Woman's Syndrome had
not yet been researched with sufficient thoroughness and scientific
rigor to meet the evidentiary requirements for expert testimony."
25
The D.C. court was not alone in holding such testimony to be
117 Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 630, 630-33 (D.C. 1979).
118 Id. at 629.
119 Id. at 630.
1' Id. at 630-31.
12 Id. at 626, 630.
"' Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye standard, as
articulated by the D.C. Appellate Court, is that there must be a "reliable body of
scientific opinion supporting a novel scientific theory before it is admissible as
evidence." Ibn-Tamas, 455 A.2d 893-94 (D.C. 1983). For further discussion of the
Frye test, see WALKER, supra note 1, at 280.
" Ibn-Tamas, 455 A.2d 893, 893 (D.C. 1983). It is reasonable to hypothesize,
however, that the male judges' gender bias influenced their decision in this case,
as the concurring opinion expresses serious concern about Dr. Walker's
characterization of men and her theories on the influence of sex-role socialization
on woman battering. For a further discussion of the gender bias issue in the justice
system, see infra notes 288-362 and accompanying text.
12 WALKER, supra note 1, at 268-74.




In marked contrast, seven years later a federal appeals
court"2 stated that "the trend among state appellate courts favors
the admissibility of expert testimony on Battered Woman's
Syndrome.' 2S So much progress has been made that numerous
courts have agreed with the Ohio Supreme Court's finding that
Battered Woman's Syndrome has "gained substantial scientific
acceptance to warrant admissibility into evidence."129
The watershed case in admitting expert testimony of Battered
Woman's Syndrome is State v. Kelly. 3 ° In 1984, the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled that the testimony met the standards for
admissibility as an expert opinion,"' and was relevant to a
determination of the self-defense standard under New Jersey law.'32
The New Jersey criminal code limits deadly force used in self-defense
to situations where the "actor reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to protect [her]self against death or serious bodily
harm."'' In the first such decision of its kind, the court held that
expert testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome could be heard to
12, See, e.g., People v. White, 414 N.E.2d 1% (Ill. 1980) (exclusion of testimony
on Battered Woman's Syndrome was irrelevant); State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660
(La. App. 1985) (testimony inadmissible to show state of mind); Buhrle v. State,
627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981) (testimony inadmissible because defendant did not fit
profile of battered woman).
" Tourlakis v. Morris, 738 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
'2 Id. at 1133. The court also pointed out that state courts have approached the
issue of admissibility as a state evidentiary question rather than one raising
constitutional issues. In fact, the court found that there were only two reported
state court decisions on this subject that made reference to the constitutional
implications; in both cases the references were made only in passing. Id.
12 State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 972 (Ohio 1990) (overruling State v. Thomas,
423 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981)). Other state courts which have upheld the
admissibility of expert testimony, or ruled that its exclusion is reversible error
include: Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Chapman v.
State, 367 S.E.2d 541 (Ga. 1988); People v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209 (Ill. 1983); State
v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563 (Kan. 1986) (rev'd on other grounds); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364 (N.J. 1983); State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. 1986); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312
(Wash. 1984).
13 Kelly, 478 A.2d 364; see also James R. Acker and Hans Toch, Battered Women,
Straw Men, and Expert Testimony: A Comment on State v. Kelly, 21 CRIM. L. BULL.
125 (1985).
n' Kelly, 478 A.2d at 380.
13 Id. at 368.
" N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2) (cited in Kelly, 478 A.2d at 364, 377).
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determine whether the defendant's belief that the regular pattern of
serious physical abuse, combined with the prior threats to kill her,
formed a reasonable basis upon which she could determine that her
life was in danger."
Gladys Kelly was charged with reckless manslaughter."
The court reasoned that expert testimony on Battered Woman's
Syndrome would be of vital importance in buttressing Kelly's
credibility by demonstrating that her experiences paralleled those of
other women in abusive relationships." Further, the court held
that the expert testimony would be central to assessing the honesty
of the defendant's belief that she was in imminent danger of
harm.137 The testimony would also be relevant in dispelling the
myths and misconceptions the jury held about battered women and
their ability to leave the abusive relationship."
In a unanimous opinion rendered the same year as Kelly, the
Washington Supreme Court held that evidence of Battered Woman's
Syndrome was properly admissible at trial to aid the jury in
assessing the defendant's perception of danger posed by the
decedent.1 39 In reaching this conclusion, the Allery court ruled that
admissibility of expert testimony is dependent on three factors:
whether the witness qualifies as an expert;" whether the expert's
opinion is based on a theory generally accepted in the scientific
community; 4 and whether the expert testimony could be helpful
to the trier of fact."4 Significantly, the court found that the expert
witness' methodology in diagnosis and treatment of battered women
had received sufficient general acceptance in the mental health
community to satisfy the second requirement of the test." The
court underscored this holding by finding that the testimony could
contribute substantially to the jury's understanding of the accused's
134 Kelly, 478 A.2d at 375.
1m Id. at 368.
136 Id. at 375.
7 Id. at 376-77. Prior to this case, the New Jersey standard of self-defense did
not include admission of evidence concerning defendant's state of mind. Schneider,
Describing, supra note 1, 208 n.80 (1986).
138 Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377.
139 State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 313-16 (Wash. 1984).






state of mind and reasonableness of her fear that her life was in
danger, thus meeting the final requirement.'"
Expert testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome was first
accepted in New York in 1985.1' In People v. Torres, the New York
Supreme Court faced a case of first impression in which a battered
woman proffered expert testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome
to bolster her claim of self-defense.'" The court found that such
testimony met the twofold test required in New York for
determining admissibility: (1) 'the testimony must be outside the
common knowledge of the trier of fact;'47 and (2) the state of
scientific knowledge must be sufficiently developed to permit a
reasonable opinion byan expert.'" Ironically, the New York court
ruled on the second prong by applying the Frye standard and
admitted the expert testimony. 49 However, the Ibn-Tamas court
used the same Frye standard and excluded the expert testimony."54
The different outcomes are likely due to the increased acceptance
that Battered Woman's Syndrome had been accorded in other
jurisdictions in the intervening years, as a result of the substantial
research efforts in the domestic violence field.'5'
A 1990 Ohio case illustrates the encouraging degree of
acceptance accorded to expert testimony in battered women's
assertions of justifiable homicide.5 2 In State v. Koss, the Ohio
Supreme Court specifically overruled prior precedent,"s' and found
that the trial court should have admitted expert testimony to
demonstrate how Battered Woman's Syndrome could have led the
defendant to perceive she was in immediate fear of death and thus
entitled to the affirmative defense of justifiable homicide.M The
court based its holding on an interpretation of proposed changes in
the penal code which were designed to inject subjectivity into the
" Allery, 682 P.2d at 317.
" People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
146 Id. at 358.
1 Id. at 362.
148 id.
149 Id. at 363.
' Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893, 894 (D.C. 1983).
151 See, e.g., State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364 (N.J. 1984).
15 State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990).
1 Id. at 974.
1'4 Id. at 973.
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reasonableness standard in homicide cases." At trial, Mrs. Koss
sought to admit evidence that she suffered from Battered Woman's
Syndrome, but the court refused to allow her to admit expert
testimony to support her claim of justifiable homicide." She was
found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to eight to
twenty-five years in prison. 7 On appeal, the court in Koss
emphasized that it was crucial for the jury to understand the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the shooting, and that expert
testimony was thus vital to the jury's assessment of whether she
honestly believed she was in imminent danger.'s
Acceptance of expert testimony on Battered Woman's
Syndrome is by no means uniform. Aside from earlier cases which
disallowed expert testimony on the basis of the novelty of its
scientific theory,5 9 objections have been raised regarding how the
testimony will be utilized by the defense."6 For example, in a
recent Minnesota case the state's highest court held that expert
testimony could only be introduced to explain Battered Woman's
Syndrome in a general sense, and could not be used to explain why
this particular defendant believed she acted in self-defense. 6' At
trial, the lower court had allowed the prosecution's motion for a
forced psychiatric examination of the defendant to counter her claim
that she suffered from Battered Woman's Syndrome. 62 While
agreeing with other jurisdictions that expert testimony on Battered
Woman's Syndrome is beyond the understanding of the ordinary lay
person, and had gained sufficient scientific status to warrant
admissibility," this court ruled that the testimony could not
include whether this particular defendant suffered from the
syndrome.'" The court appears to have grounded its holding on
" Id. at 974. For a fuller discussion of the standards of reasonableness, see
infra notes 178-287 and accompanying text.
156 Id. at 972.
"'1 Koss, 551 N.E. at 970.
' Id. at 974.
' See State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981).
160 See State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989).
" Id.; see also Sarah Crippen Madison, A Critique and Proposed Solution to the
Adverse Examination Problem Raised by Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony in State
v. Hennum, 74 MINN L. REV. 1023 (1990).
" Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 797.
16 Id. at 797-98.
1" Id. at 799.
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a finding that the forced psychiatric examination to determine
whether the defendant suffered from Battered Woman's Syndrome
was improper.'" Thus, if the prosecution was to be foreclosed
from introducing such expert testimony, so should the defense.'
The court apparently concluded that the need for a compelled
adverse medical examination of the defendant could have been
obviated by limiting the scope of the defense's expert testimony.'67
This logic is flawed. The court seems to have confused two separate
standards: the issue of forced medical examinations under
evidentiary rules relevant to defendant's rights;'" and the
usefulness of expert testimony to assist the trier of fact in assessing
whether the defendant's actions meet the standards of self-
defense.'69 It would have been more logical for the court to rule
that the adverse medical exam was improper on its merits, and to
have ruled independently on the admissibility of expert testimony,
without linking the two. 70 Fortunately, the reasoning in Hennum
does not appear to have been followed elsewhere.
Some commentators have asserted that expert testimony on
Battered Woman's Syndrome invades the province of the jury
because the subject matter is within the ken of the average juror."i
It is important to note, however, that one critic was a dissenting
judge in a case where the majority held the countervailing
opinion;"n another seems to have reached her conclusion by noting,
and then discarding, the opinions of domestic violence experts."m
Additionally, both critics appear to grossly simplify the psychological
and sociological phenomena material to the claim of self-defense
which other courts have specifically found to be outside the bounds
of common knowledge.74 As such, their argument has little merit.
A somewhat more troubling criticism leveled at the use of
expert testimony is that its probative value is outweighed by its
prejudicial impact because it tends to focus the jury's attention on the
165 Id. at 798-99.
16 Id. at 800.
167 Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989).
168 Madison, Comment, supra note 161, at 1052-54 (1990).
169 Id.
170 Id.
" Mihajilovich, Comment, supra note 115, at 1263-66.
17 Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d 626, 654 (D.C. 1979) (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
"' Mihajlovich, supra note 115.
'7 See, e.g., State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ohio 1990).
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batterer's prior bad acts. 75 Again, as this assertion only appears in
a dissenting opinion where the majority has specifically rejected this
premise, it is not entirely persuasive.76 Further, the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which many states have adopted, specifically permits
evidence of the victim's character to support a claim of self-defense
in a homicide case."n
It is evident from the foregoing review that, while the
acceptability of expert testimony is a definite trend, its use is
inextricably entwined with a court's ruling on reasonableness in self-
defense cases. The standards of reasonableness utilized in various
jurisdictions are explored below.
B. The Imminence of Perceived Danger and
the Issue of Reasonableness in Claims of Self-Defense to Homicide
The issue of reasonableness is at the heart of any defendant's
claim of self-defense to homicide. Standards of reasonableness have
plagued battered women asserting claims of self-defense, 78 and
have been the source of many battered women's convictions for
homicide.'" This has been especially apparent in those self-defense
cases where the battered woman seized an opportunity to kill her
attacker during a temporary cessation in the abuse."s  Two
categories of proof have emerged, as courts have approached the
reasonableness question both from the standpoint of case law and
statutory requirements.' 8' The more conventional view is that the
"s Id. at 977-78 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The dissent's view of expert testimony
focuses on the potentially prejudicial value of expert testimony, whereas the
majority emphasizes that expert testimony could assist the trier of fact in assessing
the defendant's belief that she was in imminent danger. Id. at 973.
176 Id. at 973.
177 FED. R. EVID. 404(a). The Advisory Committee's Notes state, in part, that
an accused may introduce pertinent evidence of the victim's character to support
a self-defense claim. 56 F.R.D. 183, 219.
'7s See State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. App. 1988), rev'd, 378 S.E.2d 8
(N.C. 1989).
1 See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 19, WALKER, supra note 1.
180 See, e.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); State v.
Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989).
1 There has been considerable academic debate as to the merits of each
argument, as well as disputes triggered by such cases as that of Bernhard Goetz,
which received wide public attention. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
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defendant's actions must appear objectively reasonable to the average
juror (the "reasonable man" standard).'82 This objective standard
for self-defense is defined as the defender's belief that she was in
imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm"8 and that her
"beliefs must not only have been honestly entertained, but also
objectively reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances." '
By contrast, the subjective standard embodies the theory that the
"justification of self-defense is to be evaluated in light of all the facts
and circumstances known to the defendant, including those known
substantially before the killing."'" As will be discussed below,
these standards do not always reflect a bright line in the case law;
decisions often exhibit an amalgam of the two theories, thus
rendering the self-defense claim more complex.
The objective standard poses particular difficulties for
battered women. As the court in State v. Wanrow so forcefully
argued:
[W]omen suffer from a conspicuous lack of access to training
in and the means of developing those skills necessary to
effectively repel a male assailant without resorting to the use
of deadly weapons .... Until such time as the effects of
[this nation's history of sex discrimination] are eradicated,
care must be taken to assure that our self-defense instructions
For a fuller discussion of the debate, see generally JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW, 2d ed. (1960); KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 110, at 847-49;
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (1961); Dolores A.
Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is The Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical
Perspective on Self-Defense And Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435 (1981).
12 However, as Gillespie points out,
A judge's instruction that tells the jurors to evaluate a self-defense
situation according to what a reasonable man would have done in the
circumstances inevitably invites them to look at the incident as though it
were a fight between two men. And that image carries with it... all of
our society's rules about how a true man - who is of course a reasonable
fellow - behaves in a fair fight. He stands and faces his adversary,
meeting fists with fists.... [Hie doesn't use a weapon unless one is being
used against him ....
GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 99.
13 United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied
414 U.S. 1007 (1973).
184 Id.
185 State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977).
1991] 133
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
afford women the right to have their conduct judged in light
of the . . . handicaps which are the product of sex
discrimination. To fail to do so is to deny the right of the
individual woman involved to trial by the same rules which
are applicable to male defendants.'
Although the Wanrow case did not address the issue of battered
women, it did open the door for courts to employ the subjective view
of reasonableness to women in justifiable homicide cases. In Wanrow,
the court ruled that the defendant was entitled to assert self-defense
when she had reason to believe the homicide victim was a dangerous
man and was startled to find him in the living room after he broke
into the house."8 7 In this landmark case, the court eloquently
underscored the need for a subjective standard by stating that:
[t]he impression created - that a 5'4" woman with a
cast on her leg and using a crutch must, under the
law, somehow repel an assault by a 6'2" intoxicated
man without employing weapons in her defense,
unless the jury finds her determination of the degree
of danger to be objectively reasonable - constitutes a
... distinct misstatement of the law .... 188
The decision in State v. Kelly discussed abovel 9 exemplifies
some of the difficulties inherent in applying standards of
reasonableness in battered women's assertions of self-defense. While
the opinion clearly set precedent by ruling that expert testimony on
Battered Woman's Syndrome was relevant to the issue of self-
defense,"9 the court seemed particularly concerned with its
applicability in explaining why the defendant had remained in the
" Id. at 558-59. Although the defendant in Wanrow was not a battered woman
who killed her abuser, the case is considered a watershed in applying the subjective
standard of reasonableness because it was the first case in which a woman
successfully asserted a claim of self-defense based on her knowledge of her
attacker's dangerous nature and the disparity between their physical statures. Id.
at 548.
1v Id. at 557.
.. Id. at 558.
18 State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
1'9 Id. at 364, 374-77.
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abusive relationship.' 9' The court reasoned that, once the jury had
either accepted or rejected the defendant's explanation for staying in
the relationship, no expert would be required to "tell the jury the
logical conclusion, namely, that a person who has in fact been
severely and continuously beaten might very well reasonably fear
that the imminent beating she was about to suffer could be either
life-threatening or pose a risk of serious injury."'" Thus, the court
applied an objective standard to the defendant's actions, while
applying a subjective standard to the reasonableness of her belief.
However, by focusing on the reasonableness of the woman's fear, the
court failed to adequately address the larger problem of the
reasonableness of her actions."l Such an undue emphasis on why
Gladys Kelly stayed in the marriage highlights the battered woman's
dilemma in self-defense cases: explanation of her actions from a
perspective as a victim of abuse fails to fully explain why she
believed it was necessary to act this time."M
In two cases with remarkably similar fact patterns, courts in
California and North Dakota have upheld diametrically opposite
positions on the objective/subjective standard issue."" Both raise
similar questions regarding the requirement of imminence of the
threatened harm in self-defense situations," and both cases can be
described as "sleeping murder" cases." Their differing results
demonstrate the tension between the two standards.
In People v. Aris"' the California Court of Appeals upheld
a conviction of second-degree murder on grounds that Aris had
failed to demonstrate an honest belief that she was in "imminent
danger of death or great bodily injury from the victim."'" At the
trial, the defendant testified that her husband beat her repeatedly
191 Id. at 364, 378.
12 Id. at 378.
"' Schneider, Describing, supra note 1, at 209-11.
19 Id. at 211.
" People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Leidholm, 334
N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
" See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 172-74; Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 814-17.
' This is a colloquial term used throughout the domestic violence literature
to describe a case in which a battered woman kills her abuser during a lull in the
attack. See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 19; WALKER, supra note 1.
19' Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1989). For a general discussion of Aris, see WALKER,
supra note 1, at 283-84.
'9 Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
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and severely throughout their ten-year marriage, and that she had
left him numerous times during that period." On each occasion,
through a mixture of threats and cajolery, he convinced her to
reconsider her decision and take him back."' On the night of his
death, her husband had assaulted her again and threatened "that he
didn't think he was going to let [her] live till the morning."' He
fell asleep shortly thereafter, and she left the bedroom to find some
ice for her bruised face.' She found a gun she hadn't known her
husband possessed on top of the refrigerator and picked it up,
believing she would need it when he started hitting her again.2'
She sat down on the bed and, certain that her husband would make
good his threat upon wakening, shot and killed him.
In support of its decision, the court cited California's penal
statute: "[h]omicide is ... justifiable .. . when there is reasonable
ground to apprehend . . . [an] imminent danger, [and] the
circumstances [are] sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable
person .... .2o6 The court interpreted this statute as requiring both
an honest belief that the danger was imminent,' and that "a
reasonable person in the same circumstances would have had the
same perception and done the same acts."' Thus, in Aris, the
court applied a subjective standard to the belief, and an objective
standard to the act. While this is the identical analysis in State v.
Kelly,' 9 the results achieved are mirror images of one another.
In holding that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony
on Battered Woman's Syndrome was harmless error,21 the
California Supreme Court went further in applying the objective
reasonableness standard, finding that expert testimony could only
have been used to demonstrate factors that would have been





' Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
z5 Id.
2 Id. (citing to CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 197, 198 (West 1988)).
"7Id. at 172.
2 Id.
' State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
20 People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171 (Ct. App. 1989).
211 Id. at 176.
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court implied that, as a matter of law, a sleeping victim posed no
immediate threat to the defendant, and hence, no reasonable person
would have believed in the imminence of the danger.2 Such a
conclusion is contrary to ample research findings which indicate that
it is all too common for there to be a lull in an acute battering
incident.213 Often the batterer falls asleep, but once he reawakens,
the battering usually continues at the same or heightened
intensity.214 The holding in Aris is also distinguishable from State
v. Kelly,21 and State v. Koss,2 6 both of which held that an
understanding of defendant's state of mind was crucial to a
determination of reasonable belief.2 7 In sum, the Aris court ruled
that the fact that the victim was shot while asleep was dispositive of
any claim of self-defense.2 8
By contrast, in State v. Leidholm a unanimous North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed, affirming a battered woman's claim of self-
defense when she killed her sleeping husband.21 '9  The factual
pattern in Leidholm bears significant similarities to that in Aris. The
Leidholm marriage followed the typical battering cycle filled with a
mixture of alcohol abuse, moments of kindness toward one another,
and moments of violence, culminating in Mrs. Leidholm killing her
212 Id. This reasoning also, of course, undermines the potential usefulness of
expert testimony in battered women's assertion of justifiable homicide.
. See, e.g., Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the
Representation of Battered Women Mw Kill, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 227, 231 (1986);
Crocker, supra note 65, at 127-28.
214 Thyfault, supra note 65, at 493-94 nn.84-85 (describing two cases in which
women killed their abusers during a cessation in the attacks). Accord State v.
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983). See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 19;
WALKER, supra note 1.
21 State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
2 State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990).
217 Kelly, 478 A.2d at 373; Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 974.
218 Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171 (1989). The court relied on rulings in other state
courts which reached similar conclusions in dealing with battered women who kill
their sleeping abusers. Id. at 175. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988)
(held self-defense not available if husband asleep); People v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d
8 (N.C. 1989). Although the Aris opinion acknowledged that other state courts (e.g.,
State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983)) have held differently, the court did
not find these other cases compelling; the court gave no specific reason for this
conclusion. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
219 See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983); see also Kris H. Davick,
Comment, 60 N.D.L. REV. 141 (1984).
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husband when he fell asleep after a prolonged battering incident.' °
The Leidholm court held that the subjective, rather than the objective
standard was appropriate and central to determining whether the
defendant had reason to believe she was faced with an imminent
threat to her life.'
The Leidholm court cogently reasoned that the most sensible
and just approach is to view "an accused's actions ... from the
standpoint of a person whose mental and physical characteristics are
like the accused's and who sees what the accused sees and knows
what the accused knows."'  In reaching this conclusion, the court
found the following view persuasive:
The significance of the difference in viewing
circumstances from the standpoint of the "defendant
alone" rather than from the standpoint of a
"reasonable cautious person" is that the jury's
consideration of the unique physical and
psychological characteristics of any accused allows
the jury to judge the reasonableness of the accused's
actions against the accused's subjective impressions of
the need to use force rather than against those
impressions which a jury determines that a
hypothetical reasonably cautious person would use
under similar circumstances.'
The Leidholm court further observed that:
a defendant's conduct is not to be judged by what a
reasonably cautious person might or might not do or
consider necessary to do under' the like
circumstances, but what [s]he h[er]self in good faith
honestly believed and had reasonable ground to
believe was necessary for [her] to do to protect
h[er]self from apprehended death or great bodily
Id. at 813.
Id. at 813-14.
m Id. at 817-18.
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983) (quoting State v. Kelly, 655 P.2d
1202, 1203 (Wash. 1982)).
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injury.'
As mentioned above, a battered woman who kills her
sleeping abuser can face formidable difficulties in asserting a claim
of justifiable homicide. In State v. Norman,"2 North Carolina courts
had two opportunities to address the issue of reasonableness and
imminence of the harm. 6  The first appeal Judy Norman filed
resulted in a remand, on grounds that her belief in the necessity of
killing her husband was sufficient to entitle her to a claim of self-
defense for shooting her sleeping husband. 7 Mrs. Norman's story
is replete with accounts of the sadistic torture and imprisonment she
suffered at her husband's hands." This court employed a four-
part test as set forth in State v. Gappins:
(1) It appeared to defendant and he believed it to be
necessary to kill the deceased in order to save himself
from death or great bodily harm; and (2) defendant's
belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as
they appeared to them at the time were sufficient to
create such a belief in the mind of a person of
ordinary firmness; and (3) defendant was not the
aggressor in bringing on the affray, i.e., he did not
aggressively and willingly enter into the fight without
legal excuse or provocation; and (4) defendant did
not use excessive force, i.e., did not use more force
than was necessary or reasonably appeared to him to
be necessary under the circumstances to protect
himself from death or great bodily harm. 9
22 334 N.W. 2d at 818 (quoting State v. Hazlett, 113 N.W.2d 374, 380-81 (N.D.
1907)).
22 State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. App. 1988), rev'd 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C.
1989). See also Kerry A. Shad, State v. Norman: Self-Defense Unavailable to Battered
Women Who Kill Passive Abusers, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (1990).
2 See generally Shad, supra note 225.
2 Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. App. 1988).
He had, among other things, beaten her while she was pregnant, causing the
baby to be born prematurely, forced her into prostitution, beat her into compliance,
put cigarettes on her skin, forced her to sleep on the concrete floor in the basement
and eat dog food, repeatedly threatened to cut her heart out, attempted to force
more sleeping pills into her when she attempted suicide, and threatened to cut off
her breasts. Id. at 587.
Id. at 590 (quoting State v. Gappins, 357 S.E.2d 654 (N.C. 1987).
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In its analysis, the court rejected the prosecution's contention
that, because the decedent was asleep at the time of the shooting, the
defendant's belief in the necessity of killing her husband was
unreasonable, as a matter of law.' The court concluded that
killing a passive victim does not preclude a defense of justifiable
homicide, 31 and emphatically opined that
we do not believe that a battered person must wait
until a deadly attack occurs or that the victim must
be actually attacking or threatening to attack at the
very moment defendant commits the unlawful act for
her to act in self-defense. Such a standard would
ignore the realities of the battered woman's
condition.232
The court applied a subjective standard to the first prong of
the four-part test, and a mixture of the subjective and objective
standard to the second.' It found that the record reflected
sufficient evidence to permit a juror, representing the person of
ordinary firmness, to infer that defendant's belief was reasonable
under the circumstances in which she found herself. 2 The court
also held that the defendant had met the other two requirements of
the test;'3 that is, she had not been the original aggressor, and the
degree of force she used had been appropriate to her situation. 2M
I One year later, the state supreme court reversed this ruling,
and held that the evidence failed to support a claim of self-
defense."3 7 The fact that the victim had been asleep when killed
2 Id. Note that this position was reversed on appeal; see supra note 225. It is
also in exact opposition to Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1989) (killing a sleeping victim
completely defeats a claim of self-defense).
2s Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 592.
Id.
Z3 Id.
2 Id. at 592. The court also held that reasonableness of Mrs. Norman's belief
in the necessity to kill her husband must be measured in light of her inability to
withdraw from the hostile situation and her degree of vulnerability to the victim.
Id.
2M Id.
Norman, 366 S.E.2d at 592.
's' State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
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was considered dispositive.' Though it acknowledged that courts
are divided on this point,' the supreme court focused its attention
on the reasonableness of the battered woman's fear, and concluded
that a sleeping victim would pose no imminent threat to a reasonable
person.2  In a compelling dissenting opinion, Judge Martin
characterized the majority as inordinately concerned that the law of
self-defense would be "expanded beyond the limits of immediacy
and necessity.""24  The majority's concern seems to have been
motivated by fears that allowing Judy Norman to plead self-defense
would set a dangerous precedent by "legaliz[ing] the opportune
killing of allegedly abusive husbands by their wives."' 2 Though
the dissent agreed that a self-defense claim must be based on the
defendant's reasonable belief she was in immediate danger, the judge
concurred with the lower court in construing the evidence to show
that Battered Woman's Syndrome would have created just such a
reasonable belief in this defendant's mind.2 '
The majority's characterization of the events and evidence
introduced at the trial shows a marked lack of understanding of
Battered Woman's Syndrome.2' This is exemplified by the
assertion that Judy Norman was responding to a "simple assault,2 45
and could have left the scene.2' In affirming Norman's conviction
and upholding the principle of objective reasonableness, the North
2 Id. at 9. The state supreme court could not find that the defendant's actions
fulfilled the requirement that the defendant have a reasonable fear of imminent
death at the time she shot her husband. Id. at 13. The court in Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr.
167 (1989), had similar difficulty, with the same result for the defendant.
239 378 S.E.2d at 15.
240 Id. at 13.
241 Id. at 16 (Martin, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 15.
242 Id. at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
244 State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 14 (N.C. 1989). Despite extensive testimony
on Battered Woman's Syndrome, on how this defendant fit the battered woman
profile, and on the escalated violence exhibited by the decedent the night he died,
the court concluded there was no evidence that Judy Norman had a reasonable
belief she was faced with imminent death or great bodily harm. Id. at 13. In fact,
the court appeared to conclude that, at the time of the shooting, she had no reason
to fear her husband at all. Id. at 13. Further, the court minimized evidence that Judy
had ever been seriously harmed, despite testimony to the contrary from
independent witnesses. Id. at 10-12.
24' Id. at 13.
246 Id.
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Carolina Supreme Court made it more problematic for other battered
women to assert a claim of justifiable homicide in non-traditional
confrontation cases.
A case decided in January 1991 in New York City serves to
highlight further the formidable barriers battered women continue to
face in the judicial system.247 Sarah Smith, a black social worker,
was convicted of murdering her abusive husband. Smith's verdict
was a "striking exception to a series of prominent cases in which
battered women seemed to gain greater acceptance" for a self-defense
claim.2' She testified that she killed her sleeping husband during
a temporary lull in the violence because she believed he would
follow through on a drunken threat made earlier that evening to "kill
her soon."249 This testimony was apparently successfully countered
by the prosecution's assertions that she could have fled the scene,
and that the danger she faced was not imminent.' In addition to
the threats on the night he died, Smith's husband had a history of
violence and assaultive behavior."1 He had twice been arrested for
assaulting police officers, and had boasted to Smith that he would
escape prosecution for killing her as he had for the other felonies. 2
Thus, despite testimony detailing years of battering, a battered
woman whose experience alerted her to a shift in the danger her
abuser posed ultimately failed to convince a jury that her actions
were justified.3
A number of the cases discussed above make reference, either
directly or indirectly, to the doctrine of retreat.' This factor has
' Tim Golden, Abused Wife Found Guilty of Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1991
at B1 (summarizing People v. Smith, Ind. No. 4824/89, Bronx Cty. Sup. Ct.).
248 Id.
249 Id. at B3.
z5 Id.
251 Id.
22 Golden, supra note 247, at B3.
This is the standard of imminence of the harm and reasonableness applied
in People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986) (whether, given Goetz's previous
experiences as a mugging victim, and his size in relation to his alleged attackers,
it was reasonable for him to believe he was in imminent danger).
2 The doctrine of retreat survives in the penal code of the following states:
Connecticut, Delaware, New York, New Jersey, New Hampshire. Rocco C.
Cipparone, Jr., Comment, The Defense Of Battered Women Who Kill, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 427, 433 (1987). Two courts that have made indirect reference to the doctrine
concluded that because a sleeping victim posed no "immediate" threat to the
battered woman, she could have left the scene without resorting to homicide. Aris,
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complicated courts' assessment of reasonableness in battered
women's self-defense cases. Retreat is one of the most difficult
concepts for courts to comprehend because the common
misconception is that the woman should have left the situation
before resorting to deadly force, thus negating the imminent danger
factor.' There is no common law or judicial construct requiring
a battered woman to retreat, except at the instant she confronts and
kills her abusive mate;' nor does she waive her legal right to act
in self-defense because she has chosen, for whatever reason, to stay
in her own home. 7 The Leidhotm court underscored this view of
retreat by noting that the defendant was under no obligation to leave
her home as she was not the original aggressor, and that her failure
to retreat was nullified by her honest, reasonable belief that she
could not withdraw safely.' However, despite the legal
irrelevance of this issue, courts often find the question difficult to
separate from a determination of the reasonableness of the
defendant's behavior.259
The standard most often cited in determining when an
opportunity to retreat defeats the right of self-defense is when the
actor knows that she can retreat with complete safety.' The
question of whether a battered woman can safely retreat is one
ideally suited for explanation as part of an expert's testimony.2'
The answer may well be pivotal to the woman's defense. The expert
264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1989); Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
2 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 121-22.
2 Id. at 144-45.
2 Id.
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 at 820-21 (N.D. 1983). Accord Commonwealth v.
Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989).
2 See, e.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Ct. App. 1989). Also, as Gillespie
ironically observes,
In case after case, in which the obligation to retreat was at issue in the
trial or on appeal, women have been convicted for killing men who were
holding them with one hand and beating them with the other or had
them pinned down on the floor or trapped in a comer or were menacing
them with a knife or a loaded gun.
GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 81. In addition, the court in Kelly had difficulty
distinguishing the issue of why Gladys stayed in the marriage from the issue of the
reasonableness of her actions. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984); see also supra
notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
2' See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(iii) (1962).
21 See GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 145.
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
can testify to the factors common to battered women and educate the
jury regarding the inapplicability of retreat to battered women in
self-defense situations.262 Such testimony can include explanation
of one of the symptoms battered women experience, principally the
"constant re-experiencing of [prior traumatic] events [and] the
psychic numbing and emotional anesthesia that is characterized by
a diminished responsiveness to events in the outside world."'2
The expert can also demonstrate an issue central to these justifiable
homicide cases: that all battered women experience a heightened
awareness of their abusive mate's behavior, often being capable of
perceiving subtle distinctions others would not notice. 264  This
ability makes the battered women more apt than an outsider to
accurately detect a time when the batterer is truly likely to pose an
imminent threat.2' In fact, this hypervigilant response mechanism
to such signals of 'unusual' violence has been characterized as. a
crucial survival skill.2'
Additionally, expert testimony can be vital in rebutting the
retreat issue by demonstrating that extreme fear is the single most
frequently cited reason battered women remain in their violent
relationships.267 The witness can cite the numerous studies which
document a battered woman's utterly realistic perception that her
only choice is between staying and being beaten, or leaving and
being killed.2' Given this Scylla and Charybdis choice, it is not
surprising that so many of them decide to stay.'
The question of which standard of reasonableness to apply
has been considered by criminal law scholars and judges whose long-
standing dispute on this subject is reflected in the lack of uniformity
among the states in utilizing one standard of reasonableness.27
Scholars have generally criticized the objective standard as having
2 See id. at 145-56.
2 Id. at 155.
'" Blackman, supra note 213, at 229.
20 Id.
2m Id.
267 WALKER, supra note 1, at 64-65.
m Id.
20 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 152-54, summarizing research work in the area
of domestic violence. See also ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL
(1987); C. Robert Showalter, et al., The Spousal-Homicide Syndrome, 3 INT'L J. LAW &
PSYCHIATRY 117 (1980).
27 See supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
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three major flaws.27' First, the fundamental concept in criminal law
of mens rea leads us to the inexorable conclusion that a person can
only be held criminally liable for an act when she possessed criminal
intent to kill.2 2 The mens rea concept refers to the defendant's
mental state and to the degree of criminal intent. '  It is
interpreted to mean that a person can only be held criminally
accountable for an act if She had an intent to kill.274 If she acted in
self-defense, she is not guilty at all.2 ' As such, it is profoundly
unjust as well as illogical to determine criminal liability through the
application of an objective standard because it completely ignores the
defendant's actual mental state. 6  Or, more simply, as Justice
Holmes observed in an oft-quoted epigram: "[d]etached reflection
cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."2'
Second, the objective standard ignores social reality by assuming that
all people are alike and will respond to identical situations in an
identical fashion.27 This assumption fails to take into account the
actor's individually and her honest perceptions of available
options.' Third, the standard may serve as a "potent force in
perpetuating the social inequities that they ignore."'
Perhaps in response to the above concerns, several states have
completely abolished the objective standard of reasonableness, either
in their state criminal statutes or by court decisions."' Others, such
as North Dakota, 2  have followed the reasoning of those
commentators advocating the approach used in the Model Penal
Code.' This approach represents a partial subjectivization of the
' See authorities cited supra note 178-79 and accompanying text.
272 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 121. See also supra note 140.
2 See KADISH & SCHLILHOFER, supra note 110, at 217.
74 See id. at 218.
275 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 121-22.
276 Id. at 122.
v KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 110, at 849 (quoting Brown v. United
States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921)).
27 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 122.
v9 Id.
Id. at 121-22.
The states are: Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania. States that
have adopted the position by court decision include: Colorado, Ohio and Indiana.
GILLESPIE, supra note 16, at 218 n.121.
'a State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 820-21 (N.D. 1983).
n3 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(iii) (1962).
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objective, reasonable person standard by requiring only that a
defendant demonstrate an honest belief in the necessity for using
deadly force;' once this is established, the reasonableness of her
actions is not questioned.'s
III. SOME FEMINIST PERSPEcVE
A persistent and vigorous debate exists in the feminist
community regarding the issues raised by battered women asserting
claims of justifiable homicide. Some experts, like Lenore Walker,'
Elizabeth Schneider, 7 and Cynthia Gillespie' believe that the
social conditions causing women to defend themselves are poorly
understood in the courtroom, and that expert testimony can
contribute significantly in improving courts' and juries'
understanding.9 In this regard, Walker argues that it is especially
vital to emphasize that the "behavior of battered women who kill
their abusers needs to be understood as normal, not abnormal.2'
Defending oneself from reasonably perceived danger of bodily harm
or death ought to be considered a psychologically healthy
response.""' And, as noted above, the woman's response is
indicative of an ability to discern that the situation had escalated





See supra note 28 (a description of Dr. Walker's credentials).
Elizabeth Schneider is an attorney and Professor at Brooklyn Law School.
She has written extensively on the subject of women's rights and is a frequent
contributor to the Women's Rights Law Reporter. She served as counsel to the
Women's Self-Defense Law Project in New York City, and was co-counsel on
appeal in State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) and co-counsel for amicus
curiae in State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
2 Cynthia Gillespie is an attorney in Seattle active in women's defense work.
She founded the Northwest Women's Law Center in Seattle, Washington, and has
provided expert testimony on Battered Women's Syndrome in a number of
homicide trials. She has conducted extensive case study research on the fate of
battered women who kill in self-defense.
' Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 67. See GILLESPIE, supra note 19; WALKER,
supra note 1.
29 WALKER, supra note 1, at 169.
21 Id.
'9 Blackman, supra note 213, at 229.
The concern expressed by these experts is underscored by the
masculine origins of the law of self-defense. As Gillespie observes,
our notions of self-defense hearken back to a situation in which a
man "stands and faces his adversary, meeting fists with fists ...
[and] doesn't use a weapon unless one is being used against
him."'  Gillespie also contends that, even if the court uses the
"reasonable person" standard rather than the "reasonable man"
standard, fighting will still be defined in our society along sex
stereotypical lines;' and the outlook for the battered woman
claiming she killed in self-defense will suffer accordingly.29
Moreover, the traditional notion of self-defense, which tends to be
defined as an actor responding to a single encounter, is totally at
odds with battered women's experiences.'
Authorities also agree that the gender bias issue pervades the
judicial and law enforcement systems in an insidious fashion.297
The police force is not only the battered woman's first line of
defense, it is the legal system's first opportunity to communicate to
the battered woman that she is not to blame for the abuse and that
society does not condone it.' Nevertheless, police policy toward
battered women runs the gamut from "outright refusal to arrest
batterers and recognize domestic violence as a criminal matter, to a
practice of giving domestic violence calls lower priority than non-
2 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 99. See also Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note
67, at 631-33.
mhe [equal force] rule rests on the assumption of two adversaries equal
in size, strength and physical training. However, few women have the
size or strength of a male assailant or the training in physical combat
necessary to protect themselves. . . . The woman believes, usually
correctly, that her husband is capable of severely injuring or killing her
without a weapon....
The deadly force rule is particularly troublesome for a battered woman.
Although she may have no alternative but to defend herself with a
weapon, the traditional interpretation of the... rule can render her use
of a deadly weapon unreasonable.
Id. For an additional comment on the gender-bias issue in reasonable self-defense
claims, see supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
29 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 99-100.
2 Id.
Mihajlovich, supra note 115, at 1257.
Schneider, Describing, supra note 1, at 198-200.
Matthew Litsky, Note, Explaining the Legal System's Inadequate Response To
The Abuse Of Women: A Lack Of Coordination, 8 N.Y.L.S. J. HUM. RTS. 149, 160 (Fall
1990).
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domestic disputes."'2 It is chilling to note that, according to one
survey, police procedures in fewer than twenty-five percent of the
jurisdictions examined required arresting the batterer.
Three cases, similar to State v. Allery,' °1 highlight the
tragedy faced by a multitude of women whose reliance on law
enforcement was sadly misplaced. Roxanne Gay, 2 the wife of a
professional football player, frequently called the police when her
husband beat her.' On arriving at the house, the officers usually
ended up discussing football with her husband, taking no action on
her behalf.' Another woman, Clara' stabbed her boyfriend
with a kitchen knife while he was twisting the belt that he had been
beating her with around her neck.'3° Shortly before, she had called
the police because he was drunk and violent."°7 When they
arrived, not only did they refuse to arrest the boyfriend, but they
suggested Clara be arrested for assault since the boyfriend had
sustained an injury to his hand while struggling with her." Carol
Stonehouse, a Pittsburgh police officer, repeatedly requested
assistance from her own police force in preventing her former boyfriend
Bill (also a police officer) from his continual harassment and
attacks.' °  On over fifty occasions, he broke into her apartment,
destroyed its contents, and threatened her with bodily harm.31 °
Since those she asked for help, including the Internal Affairs
Department, were all Bill's colleagues, they dismissed her complaints
2 Id. at 161 (footnotes omitted) (citing Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the
Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them Mhen The Police Won't, 95
YALE L.J. 788, 788-89 nn.3-4 (1986)).
3 Id. at 161 n.77. This is likely due to the fact that domestic violence
situations pose such a great danger to anyone attempting to interrupt them. See
WALKER, supra note 1, at 44.
' State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984). See supra notes 6-10 and
accompanying text.





307 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 13.
SId.
Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989) (emphasis added);
see also Gayle Stommen, Comment, 63 TEMP. L. REv. 375 (1990).
311 Stonehouse, 555 A.2d at 774-90.
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as frivolous and took no action.31" ' Nevertheless, Stonehouse
eventually succeeded in obtaining several restraining orders, but they
proved ineffective, as Bill continued his attacks.312 She moved
several times, only to find the attacks escalate in frequency and
severity;1 3 she even woke up to find him in her bedroom at night,
menacing her infant granddaughter.3 14 The last time Bill came after
Carol with a .357 Magnum, she managed to get to her service
revolver, and killed him.3' Despite the prosecutor's contention
that Pittsburgh's law enforcement system was "ready, willing and
able to protect women who are victims of domestic violence, '01" 6 the
police lieutenant who arrested Carol testified that police reports are
almost never made in domestic disturbance situations. 317  While
these stories may seem egregious examples of the situation many
battered women find themselves in vis S vis law enforcement, they
are not uncommon occurrences."8
A summary of a nationwide survey of the legal system's
response to abused women1 9 indicates that while some inroads
have been made, legislatures, police departments, prosecutors and
judges have failed to vigorously respond to the epidemic of violence
against women in our society.'2 As recently as 1989, a New York
City task force'2' determined that the "Byzantine nature of the
present ... complaint process makes it difficult for at-risk persons to
obtain an order of protection,"' and that even the most





31- Stonehouse, 555 A.2d at 794-95.
31" Id. at 807.
317 Id. at 807-08.
318 See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 19, WALKER, supra note 1; Crocker, supra
note 65; Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 67.
31' Litsky, supra note 300. See also Stonehouse, 555 A.2d at 808-09 (noting that
research conducted in England revealed that police are among those groups with
the highest incidence of wife-beating) (citing Lenore E. Walker et al., Beyond the
Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1982)).
'2 Litsky, supra note 300, at 151.
Id. at 158 n.52.
3I Id. at 158-59 nn.52-53.
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too onerous.3' Obtaining "restraining" orders is also hampered by
many states' limiting relief to abused spouses.324 Moreover, as
Allery3'- and Stonehouse326 so vividly illustrate, even if a woman
succeeds in obtaining an order of protection, its effectiveness is
extremely limited.327
In the last few years, an encouraging trend has emerged in
police response to battered women,3" perhaps due in part to
several recent court decisions that imposed liability on the police for
failure to protect battered women.329 However, despite marked
progress over the last decade in changing police department policies
to offer greater protection to battered women, "judicial attitudes and
courtroom practices have.., lagged behind."'  This is attributable
to the fact that judicial misconceptions about the nature of woman
abuse matches that of the jury." Gillespie points to the recent
3Z Id. at 159 nn.53-54.
32 Id. at 159 nn.53-54.
3 State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984).
3 Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989).
3 Litsky, supra note 300, at 160 n.67 ("Orders of Protection are only worth the
paper they are written on.") (quoting Ellen Yaroshefsky, Private Practitioner,
Remarks at a Panel Discission on Battered Women, presented by the Legal
Association for Women, New York Law School, Nov. 3, 1989).
32 Id. at 165.
m Id. at 162. Litsky summarized three court cases which held police
departments liable for failure to protect battered women from their abusive
partners. Id. at 164-65 (discussing Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521
(D. Conn. 1984)); Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Sorichetti v. City
of New York, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1978)). Litsky concluded
that by holding the police departments liable, these cases may have served as an
impetus to improve police responsiveness to battered women. Id. at 164-65.
'1 Litsky, supra note 300, at 169 (citing Recent Developments: Judging Domestic
Violence, 10 HARV. WOMEN's L. J. 278 (1987)).
' GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 191-92 (citing Report of New York Task Force On
Women In The Courts, 15 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1 (1986-87); The First Year Report Of
The New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force On Women In The Courts, 9 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 129 (1986)). For a more detailed discussion of a nation-wide survey of
gender bias, see Gail Diane Cox, Reports Track Discrimination: Fourteen Volumes
Chronicle How Women Are Treated in Court, N.Y.L.J. Nov. 26, 1990, at 1. A further
example of gender bias is evident in Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772
(Pa. 1989). The prosecutor stressed that if Carol Stonehouse had wanted to, she
could have ended the "relationship" with her abusive partner Bill. Id. at 783.
Notably, the prosecutor asserted that since Carol was a police officer, she could not
have been a victim of abuse. Id. The prosecutor attempted to prove that Carol
deliberately provoked Bill by dating other men. Id. at 776. However, the prosecutor
NOTES
studies of gender bias undertaken in New York and New Jersey,
both of which concluded that women are systematically
discriminated against in the courts. 2 In summarizing the findings,
she observed that:
myths, biases and stereotypes about women pervade
the decision-making process and often affect the
outcome of cases. Women are apt to be regarded as
inherently less credible than men and, when they
appear in court seeking justice as victims of violence,
they are frequently the targets of the most callous
sort of victim blaming. 33
Gillespie deplores the gender bias exemplified by a judge's
ruling that a woman had not made a sufficient case for self-defense
to send the question to the jury,' despite having heard evidence
that her partner pistol-whipped her, pointed a loaded gun at her, and
threatened to kill her just before she shot him.' As she so
convincingly argues, judges with gender-biased attitudes are
common throughout our judicial system, even at the lower court
levelf where the battered woman who has killed her abuser in
self-defense will first appear.337
Gillespie further contends that this gender bias extends to the
preoccupation of juries with the question of why the woman did not
leave the violent relationship.' She asserts that the question
subsumes two assumptions: that controlling male violence "is the
woman victim's responsibility, not the man's;"33' 9 and that the
completely ignored the fact that Carol had stopped dating Bill years before because
he was married. Id. at 775. The trial court also found her assertion of self-defense
unreasonable precisely because the "relationship" continued. Id. at 783. Clearly
these distorted characterizations of an abusive situation indicate how gender bias
severely skews the perception of the issues of reasonable fear of bodily harm.
33 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 191.
3M Id.
34 Id. at 192.
3 Id.
' Id. Clearly, if the woman chooses to assert a claim of self-defense, she will
most likely have to take her claim to trial in order to be vindicated.
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family home belongs to him, and "he has the right to drive her out
of it."'  As she points out, it is the woman who is forced (if she
does decide to leave) to abandon her home and her possessions and
surrender her freedom to hide behind locked doors in an
overcrowded shelter.' Moreover, these sexist attitudes are
reflected in the fact that a woman's reasonableness is so suspect that
she requires an expert witness to explain why, after she has been
repeatedly beaten and threatened with death, she has good reason to
fear her tormentor.'
There are some theorists who argue that the use of Battered
Woman's Syndrome, as presented by an expert witness, poses the
danger of encouraging courts to find the women mentally ill, with
the consequence that the woman's own psychological condition,
rather than the underlying social conditions, will be blamed.'
This is a compelling argument, as testimony focusing on the
helplessness, handicaps, and passivity of battered women tends to
reinforce just those stereotypes about women the expert testimony is
designed to dispel.' In addition, the legal system's traditional
expectation that a woman who kills a man will rely on an insanity
or diminished capacity defense also serves to strengthen the
stereotype of women as irrational and emotional. '  Further,
Schneider persuasively argues that the word 'syndrome' (in Battered
340 Id.
341 id.
342 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 192-93. As Gillespie so compellingly asks:
How else can one account for the fact that a jury that has heard
testimony that a man once plunged his hand up to the elbow
into his wife's rectum and tore out a fistful of her intestines
should need an expert to explain that when the man grabbed her
and choked her and threatened to rip out her windpipe her fear
that he might do it was reasonable?
Id. at 192-93 (emphasis in original).
3 WALKER, supra note 1, at 10-13. But it has been contended that the standard
of reasonableness makes it too difficult in some cases for a battered woman to
successfully assert a claim of justifiable homicide, and that a plea of temporary
insanity makes an acquittal more likely. Cipparone, supra note 255, at 428-29. It
is possible that the author's gender (male) influenced his opinion. Two other
authors propose a different solution: that the battered woman plead excuse, (rather
than justifiable homicide) and accept a charge of manslaughter. See Mihajlovich,
supra note 115; Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense, Correcting A Historical
Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 11 (1986).
' Schneider, Describing, supra note 1, at 197-200.
3' GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 179-80.
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Woman's Syndrome) tends to connote mental infirmity, and can lead
to a court perceiving the defendant as somehow mentally
impaired.' "Regardless of its more complex meaning, the term
'battered woman syndrome' has been heard to communicate an
implicit but powerful view that [the woman is] suffering from a
psychological disability and that this disability prevents [her] from
acting 'normally."' 7  It is also notable that the more practical
implication of some sort of insanity defense is that even if the
defense is successful, the woman will be incarcerated in a mental
institution rather than acquitted in a self-defense claim.' This is
cruelly ironic, for, as Walker points out, most battered women who
kill their abusers show no signs of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
once they are able to live without fear of further violence.'
Additionally, as Schneider contends, the notion of Battered
Woman Syndrome "contains the seeds of old stereotypes of women
in new form.., which has the potential to exclude battered women
whose circumstances depart from the model and force them once
again into pleas of insanity or manslaughter rather than expanding
our understanding of reasonableness."'
The foregoing discussion of Battered Woman's Syndrome
from the feminist perspective has been criticized by commentators on
several grounds. One charge has been that expert testimony on the
3" Schneider, Describing, supra note 1, at 207, 217. As Schneider notes, a
number of courts have characterized expert testimony on Battered Women's
Syndrome as indicative of "extreme emotional disturbance, misunderstanding the
purpose for which the testimony was offered." Id. at 217 n.148. She references the
following cases: Ledford v. State, 333 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. 1985) (court ordered
competency hearing); State v. Edwards, 420 So. 2d 663 (La. 1982) (appellate counsel
claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to present Battered Woman's
Syndrome to show diminished capacity); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984); People v. Powell, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Tompkins County Ct. 1980), affd,
442 N.Y.S.2d 645 (App. Div. 1981) (testimony on battered woman's syndrome
relevant to diminished capacity); State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984)
(prosecutor's theory that Battered Woman Syndrome is analogous to insanity
defense); but cf. People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (Battered
Woman's Syndrome specifically not offered for mental disease or defect).
Schneider, Describing, supra note 1, at 207.
3g WALKER, supra note 1, at 176-78.
349 Id.
3 Schneider, Describing, supra note 1, at 216.
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subject leads to the establishment of a new category of self-
defense."' However, authorities on battered women's defense,
such as Schneider and Thyfault,"2 rebut this allegation by
emphasizing that the "battering, or a history of abuse alone, does not
justify a homicide,"' and that the testimony is offered only to help
the jury understand how the phenomenon impacts the woman's
claim of self-defense.' The court in Koss agreed, stressing the
relevance of the expert testimony about a defendant's reasonable
belief she was in imminent danger.355
Another criticism is that allowing battered women to plead
justifiable homicide will either foster a climate of "open season on
men,"'356 create a law biased in women's favor, 7 or encourage
other women willfully to kill their abusers without reason.3'
Dennis Watkins, president of the Ohio Prosecuting Attorney's
Association, asserted that "[n]ow instead of going to the courts or
getting a divorce, these women will think, 'Maybe I'll kill him."'" 9
These concerns are groundless and highly conclusory, and seem to
reflect an unconscious male fear that women will rightfully defend
themselves when attacked. As noted above, the recommended
approach, favoring the subjective standard of reasonableness, is
entirely gender neutral.'
s "The battered wife syndrome is yet another new defense seeking the
attention of criminal law specialists." Schneider, supra note 1, at 199 n.18 (quoting
James R. Acker & Hans Toch, Battered Women, Straw Men, and Expert Testimony: A
Comment on State v. Kelly, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 125 (1985)).
32 Schneider, Describing, supra note 1, at 199; Thyfault, supra note 65, at 495.
5 Thyfault, supra note 65, at 495.
3% Id.
Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990).
GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 10 (referring to remarks made in response to
Francine Hughes' acquittal).
W7 Id.
' Tamar Lewin, More States Study Clemency for Women Who Killed Abusers, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1991, at A19.
' Id. These remarks were made in response to the Ohio governor's recent
grant of clemency to twenty-six women imprisoned in Ohio for killing their
abusers. Id.
0 As evidence of the doctrine's gender neutrality, see e.g., People v. Goetz, 497
N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
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IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The lack of uniformity among U.S. jurisdictions poses
formidable barriers to battered women asserting claims of justifiable
homicide. This task is made more difficult by the varying
interpretations placed on reasonableness, and whether the subjective
or objective standard is applied to the belief and/or the defendant's
actions, or both. Lack of uniformity is further complicated by the
two types of factual patterns that emerge in these cases: the
confrontation case, where the woman repels her abuser with deadly
force in the midst of an acute battering attack;' and the sleeping
victim case, where the abused woman kills her batterer during a
(temporary) lull in his attacks. 2  As noted above, there is no
uniform approach taken by U.S. courts in either type of situation,
although juries traditionally have had a harder time acquitting
defendants in the second category.
The task of altering statutes to accommodate more fairly the
factual issues in battered women's justifiable homicide cases by
legitimizing the subjective standard presents significant difficulties.
As criminal law is a state matter, changes in the law must be
accomplished on a state by state basis for the change to be effective.
Even if these changes are made, the resulting statutes will have to be
sufficiently specific to ensure that all courts in that state interpret
them congruently. This seems a daunting prospect, with a mixed
chance of success.
Despite the foregoing, there are some solutions for redressing
the inequities in our judicial system. The following persuasive
recommendations were culled from a variety of sources in the
domestic violence literature.2
A. Suggested Changes in the Application of
Standards of Reasonableness
The concept of imminence of the harm should be relaxed
somewhat, as it is more appropriately applicable to the traditional
equal force scenario, and has minimal relevance in most battering
3" See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
See State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990).
3" GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 184-85.
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situations. One remedy, sugaested by, the Model Penal Code,3'
and by the Leidholm court, would open up the time frame
sufficiently for the battered woman to act before her abuser strikes her
again.' Alternatively, courts could define a statutory requirement
of "imminence" as "impending," which would be perfectly consistent
with a gap in time between the perception or the imminent event
and its occurrence. 7
It has also been suggested that the subjective, rather than the
objective standard, should be employed uniformly in determining
whether the actor's behavior meets the test of reasonableness.' As
noted earlier, the subjective standard is not only more applicable to
battered women's self-defense claims,3' it is more logically in line
with the concept of mens rea implicit in our criminal law system.37
Further, past actions of the abuser should be considered relevant in
all cases and admitted into evidence to provide the jury with an
understanding of the defendant's genuineness of belief.3  At a
minimum, Gillespie proposes that the "reasonable man" standard be
replaced by the "reasonable person" standard, rendering the standard
gender neutral. 2
In addition, some commentators have proposed the abolition
of the retreat doctrine in battered women's self-defense cases. 3
The doctrine poses two major obstacles: it requires a battered
woman to flee her home, and it is frequently confused with the
question of why the woman stayed in the relationship. 4 Failing
a formal repeal of the retreat portion of a statute, appropriate jury
instructions explaining that the woman had no affirmative obligation
to terminate the relationship or to leave her home would sufficiently
emasculate the doctrine and restore a more balanced approach to
justifiable homicide cases.
3" MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (1962). See also GILLESPIE, supra note 19,
at 186.
m5 State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W. 811 (N.D. 1983).
36 Id. at 815.
a GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 187.
Leidholm, 334 N.W. at 818. See also Davick, supra note 219.
3w9 Id.
370 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 121.
an See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
3 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 189.
37 See State v. Alery, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (Wash. 1984).
'" See supra notes 255-62 and accompanying text.
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B. Suggestions Regarding the, Use of Expert Testimony
Most advocates of reform agree that expert testimony on
Battered Woman's Syndrome -should be admissible in all cases.
375
While, as noted above, some critics have argued that this is a
recommendation of a separate law for battered women, 6 this
assertion lacks merit. Significantly, expert testimony on a wide
variety of subjects is admissible in all jurisdictions, and testimony
about Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in particular can be useful to
defendants of either gender in a variety of contexts, including rape
and child abuse.
Defense attorneys should emphasize, through the use of
expert testimony, the notion that the battered woman was
responding appropriately to her situation, and that her fear of death
or serious harm was, indeed, reasonable. 3' This testimony should
underscore the battered woman's characteristically heightened sense
of awareness to danger, as well- as the view that battered women are
more likely to be killed themselves if they attempt to escape their
violent relationships. ' Further, testimony explaining the
'flashback' sensations battered women experience would help serve
to convince a jury of the 'woman's perception of imminent
danger.' While some explanation of why the woman remained
in the relationship is useful to allay confusion, attempts should be
made to de-emphasize the concepts of learned helplessness and
victimization.' This will minimize the sexual stereotyping of the
actor, which only serve to highlight the apparent contradiction of a
helpless woman who took direct action to save her life.81
C. A Preliminary Suggestion for Reform
One recommendation not mentioned by any of the experts
above is to take the legal solutions one step further by creating a new
category of self-defense, tentatively entitled the Battered Woman
See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 19; WALKER, supra note 1; Blackman, supra
note 209; Crocker, supra note 65; Schneider, supra note 1; Thyfault, supra note 65.
376 See supra notes 171-76.
3" Madison, supra note 161, at 1029.
37 GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 170.
3N See id. at 156.
' See Blackmun, supra note 265, at 230.
3 See id.
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Defense. This proposal would include a completely subjective
standard of reasonableness, such as 'that used by the court in
Leidholm,' 2 and would eliminate completely the requirement for
imminence of the harm as it is currently employed. The standards
of proof would include: (a) that a defendant offer, through expert
testimony by a mental health professional experienced in diagnosing
Battered Woman's Syndrome, evidence that she had been through a
minimum of two acute battering cycles before the killing; (b) a
requirement that a defendant demonstrate an honest belief that her
abusive spouse's behavior had escalated to such a degree within the
48 hours preceding the homicide that she was in fear for her life or
of grave bodily injury; and (c) a statutory rejection of the retreat
doctrine, thus simplifying the jury's ability to reach a conclusion
regarding the defendant's actions.
This suggested reform would address many of the significant
difficulties currently associated with battered women's self-defense
claims. It is believed, by many of the experts mentioned above, and
by this author, that the current formulations of criminal codes are
poorly equipped to address battered women's circumstances with
sufficient fairness. The approaches used in even the more
enlightened jurisdictions are, at best, efforts to fit a square peg into
a round hole, as battered women who resort to killing their batterers
often do not conform to the legal standards used to maintain a claim
of self-defense. While it is certainly true that legislation codifying
this proposal would likely encounter many obstacles to passage, it
would go far in eliminating much of the gender bias inherent in the
criminal codes and allow juries to assess more accurately the.
blameworthiness of a battered woman defendant.
D. Suggested Changes in Social Policies
Experts in the field of domestic violence agree that a variety
of social remedies are desperately needed.' They propose that
more victim's shelters be established to meet the needs of battered
women.' In addition, our legal system should facilitate speedy
divorces in cases of battery, and cease awarding joint custody to
State v. Leidhohn, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
, GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 193; WALKER, supranote 1, at 235-38, 242.
- Crocker, supra note 65, at 132-34.
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parents in such divorce cases.' Likewise, changes are needed in
the manner in which our police forces respond to domestic violence
situations.' At a bare minimum, police officers must be more
willing to take the battered woman's complaints seriously, and to
intervene more vigorously on her behalf.
Several encouraging notes of reform have been observed in
recent months. Senator Biden, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, has introduced in Congress a bill that is aimed at
stemming violence against women and that increases funding for
services to aid victims.- 7  The statute would create federal
penalties for abusers who cross state lines to attack their spouses,
would make protective court orders issued in one state valid in all
50, and would authorize $125 million for domestic-violence
programs. ' This sum would include $75 million for battered-
women's shelters, triple the current federal contribution.' 9 Also,
in what may presage a growing trend, governors in Ohio and
Maryland granted clemency to women who were serving sentences
for killing men that had abused them.39'
In conclusion, it is clear that adoption of the
recommendations outlined above, along with the proposed federal
legislation,39' can go a long way towards a more just treatment of
battered women at all levels in our society. It is also clear that
significant inroads have been made in the defense of battered women
in society's recognition of the magnitude of the domestic violence
epidemic. However, it must be emphasized that none of the
foregoing suggestions encompass a methodology for eradicating the
gender bias that pervades our social order and system of justice.
While such concerns are beyond the scope of this note, it is clear that
WALKER, supra note 1, at 139, 145-47, 163-64.
GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 13; Barbara K. Finesmith, Police Response to
Battered Women: A Critique and Proposals for Reform, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 74, 103
(1983).
W Linda P. Campbell, U.S. Help Needed, Battered Women Tell Panel, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Dec. 12, 1990, at 6. The bill has been approved by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, but failed to reach the Senate floor prior to the holiday adjournment.
Id. Senator Biden intends to reintroduce the bill in the 1991 session. Id.
-8 Id.
3V Id.
' Lewin, supra note 360, at A19; Sam Roberts, Trying to Give Equal Justice to
Jailed Women, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1991, at B1.
' Campbell, supra note 388, at 6.
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the work of educating the public and the judicial system about the
realities of domestic violence must continue. Sadly, Sarah
Smith's' recent conviction, in a state that utilizes a subjective
standard of reasonableness in justifiable homicide cases, serves as a
potent and vivid reminder that the battle for acceptance of battered
women's claims of self-defense is still not won.
Alene Kristal
• See Golden, supra note 248.
